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Abstract 
 
Spurred by the recent global economic crisis, Social Innovation (SI) has gained increasing attention in the European 
Commission (EC) agenda. However it remains a heterogeneous and ill-defined concept, whose boundaries are unclear.  
Presently within EC discussions, it encapsulates a variety of concepts from social enterprises to societal change. 
Adopting an ethnographic methodology, this analysis provides insight into the contrasting official “front-stage” and the 
“back-stage” views, constraints and practices by which SI has been adopted and promoted by the EC. While the “front-
stage” perspective is more intentionally based on the official situations, documents, and statements, the “back-stage”  is 
informed by both the ethnographic analysis and its relationship with the “front-stage” perspective. The main finding of the 
analysis is that SI might be presumably seen as the only way to align the Commission’s conservative-liberal policy, 
which is rooted in the Lisbon Agenda, with the pressing social demands which stem from the 2008 financial crisis. 
However, this analysis also indicates that, rather than a novel policy stream, SI can also be seen as a policy compromise 
that can be used to detract from debates around the need to develop  a full-fledged EU Social Policy; more deeply, 
detract the policy debate from facing a thorough reflection on our society and development model. The analysis  will also 
provide an overview of the risks associated with current thinking viewed from the perspective of EU players operating in 
the socio-political domain.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Along 2007, with the first signals of the recent financial, economic and social crisis, Social Innovation (SI) has come to 
the forefront of the European Union policy thinking1 and has accelerated in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis 
explosion. SI ranges across a wide area of community policies from new models of childcare to web-based social 
networks; from the care of the elderly to climate change. It is commonly understood as a new policy and management 
stream field that cuts across traditional domains encompassing notions of novelty harnessed to the active involvement of 
citizens aiming to address current social challenges. 
 
The seminal work “The EU Social Reality Report”2 and the subsequent European Social Agenda3 made clear that 
Europe and the world were facing an unprecedented and unexpected social crisis. This evidence challenged many of the 
assumptions that had shaped the Lisbon Strategy4, which assumed that investing in knowledge would deliver growth 
and jobs; the social welfare, according to this framework, was implicitly a kind of “spill over” that would stem from 
improved wealth and more equal distribution as far as knowledge was proposed as an asset for all. Hence, it is 
appropriate to question whether the deep social impact of the crisis, which was already clear at its early stages, was 
caused by wrong assumptions about the strategy itself or by weak policy implementations by member states and a need 
to broaden its fundamental goals: is  the Lisbon framework the right strategy which simply requires a broader 
implementation or should the strategy itself be reconsidered and be re-discussed at its roots?  
 
It is to be noted that, already in 2005, when facing stagnating growth and the emerging challenges of global competition, 
at the start of Barroso’s mandate and its Mid-Term Review of the Lisbon Strategy5 the Commission was facing a similar 
issue: is it a matter of strategy or implementation? At that time the second answer was chosen; namely, policy action 
should have been focusing on a better, more thorough and focused implementation of the strategy, while confirming its 
validity. Through the years of the crisis, the same question was raised and a similar answer provided. The strategy is 
valid although there is a clear need to broaden its focus to embrace the social sphere which was, up to that moment, 
substantially neglected. Hence, there were no specific or self-standing EU Social Policy proposals for direct interventions 
by what was traditionally called “the welfare state”. Rather it was more a matter of fine-tuning current strategic directions, 
rather than developing new policies to directly tackle increasing social demands and face a dramatic social context. In 
this view, SI becomes a vehicle that allows the inclusion of a  “Social” dimension within the overarching Lisbon umbrella. 
However, since the SI concept is so ill defined, there was a clear risk of inventing policies based on old solutions that are 
seeking for new problems to legitimize their existence6 or else on the basis  of fads and fashions7. 
 
In this context, the first goal of this paper is to explore the various definitions given in literature to the concept of SI and, 
on the basis of the EC report on Social Innovation8, to provide a preliminary but at least bounded set definitions of SI 
able to draw some limits about what it is and what it is not. We will refer, in the first part of the paper, to the “Front-stage” 
policy stance which represents the official reasons that were put forward to pursue and justify such a new policy 
pathway. 
 The second goal of this paper is to explore the reasons why such a concept, even when ill-defined and unproved, was 
so enthusiastically adopted by the EU Commission. This explanation will be based upon the author’s ethnographic  study 
based on data collection of this process from October 2005 to December 2011. This study presents a more intimate view 
delving beyond the “official” stance in order to understand what led the EC to embrace so swiftly this new concept  and 
what evidence was used to support it. In short, we will explore the reasons why this policy choice has been made and 
how the trajectory of this decision has developed. 
 
Thirdly, in the context of the current economic crisis (we refer to the year 2012), we question whether it makes sense to 
speak about SI in the current form, as this risks adding to the already existing confusion about what should be done in 
the social domain and postponing a deeper reflection on the assumptions underlying the European social and 
development model. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 will provide of the current of the concept of SI and will try to outline a logic 
in their evolution. Section 3 will provide some context about our focal point (the European commission), describing a 
brief “factual” history of how SI became popular in the EC policy phrasing and actions, and explore the EC definition(s) of 
SI, as they stem from the EC Social Innovation Report, adopting a “Front-stage” perspective. Section 4 will introduce a 
“back-stage” view from a methodological perspective while section 5 will analyse from this “Back-stage” (that is, from 
inside the EC) the development of the SI concept according to the people, views, practices, aims and motivations that 
were relevant within the EC debate at that time. Section 6 will highlight some risks related to current concepts and their 
implementation while section 7 will draw conclusions, limits, and opportunities for further research. 
 
2. Definitions of Social Innovation 
 
Definitions of Social Innovation (SI) abound and it is easy to get entangled in a debate over meanings and nuances. A 
recent collection of definitions can be found in the chapter on social entrepreneurship and SI in the OECD report9.  
In a first and intuitive sense, we find that SI could be seen as innovation inspired by the desire to meet pressing social 
needs which can be neglected by traditional forms of private market provision and which have often been poorly served 
or unresolved by services organised by the state10,11. In this sense, ‘Innovation’ refers to the generic capacity to create 
and implement novel ideas which deliver value. Focusing on the outcome dimension (social value), ‘Social’ refers to 
the kind of value that innovation is expected to deliver: a value that is less concerned with profit and more with issues 
such as quality of life, social justice and well-being. Here, SI has been pursued at different levels, from the micro level, 
delegating the role of generating SI to the individual entrepreneur, through the meso level of public/private partnerships, 
to the macro level whereby governments and institutions innovate patterns of social interaction to generate social value 
through policies, laws, and institutional reforms. In this direction, Social Innovation is “… can also be a principle, an idea, 
a piece of legislation, a social movement, an intervention, or some combination of them”12.  
According to this view, the social entrepreneur or innovator is often seen as an important player in transforming social 
norms13. They are pioneers, having to deal with those who resist social change as they fear the unknown outcomes of 
it14; by forming social partnerships and cooperation networks, social innovators are able to adopt novel approaches in 
solving social problems, and thereby overcome this inertia and risk aversion15,16. They  engage in economic activities, 
producing goods or social and health services or pursuing various societal objectives that contribute to the development 
of local communities as well as society in general17, but the managers and partners of these companies operate without 
seeking to add pecuniary or material gains to their assets18. Profits, when they occur, are (re)invested in the enterprise to 
help it to achieve its social objectives. According to this approach, SI are innovations that respond to social demands 
that are traditionally not addressed by the market or existing institutions and are directed towards the vulnerable groups 
in society. Here, SI questions and calls for a review of the way in which the welfare state is to be organised and 
delivered19,20,21 and how it should be reinvented10 and wealth measured22. Yet, while innovation traditionally refers to 
shifting the technological frontier to increase productivity, SI goes hand in hand with the increasing ongoing reflections 
on the nature of well-being. Hence, as pointed out by Daniel Kahneman23 and more recently by the Stiglitz 
Commission24, traditional wealth measures, such as those related to the Gross Domestic Product, do not fully reflect the 
quality of life or more general notions of ‘happiness’25 or ‘well-being’. In this sense, Social Innovation has been said to 
add multiple dimensions of output measurement beyond those related to material growth26.  
 
Such definitions shift and enlarge the notion of SI not just beyond the micro dimension, but also beyond the outcome 
dimension. In particular, as regards the latter, some have stressed also the process dimension of SI underlining that it 
is not just about pursuing an innovative social outcome, but also about an innovative endeavour, a novel way to shape 
patterns of social interaction to achieve a social goal. Indeed, many have stressed that an important aspect of SI is the 
process of social interactions between individuals to reach desired outcomes. As again Stiglitz puts it, “we care not only 
about outcomes, but also about processes. It makes a difference, for instance, whether we choose what we consume or 
if it is given to us... an economic system is to be evaluated not just on outcomes but on how outcomes are arrived at.”  
 
This evolution of the ‘process’ dimension is consistent with many other recent developments in the field of business 
innovation which have stressed open, collaborative, participative and non-linear aspects. In fact, the recognition of SI as 
a force for innovation and change follows the rise of Open Innovation27, a business-oriented concept whereby end-user 
involvement and open collaboration is stressed. In this line, it has been noted that often the most exciting social 
innovations occur at the edges or interfaces between sectors28. Indeed, the concept of SI stems from the need for a 
change both in terms of the outcomes that innovation is expected to deliver and the process through which these 
outcomes are generated. Hence, SI relates not only to developing innovative solutions to address social 
demands, but also to new forms of organisation and interactions to tackle social issues. 
 
These two views led to the suggestion made by an EC commissioned study of the Young Foundation which would define 
SI as innovations that are social in both their ends and their means29: “Specifically, we define social innovations as new 
ideas (products, services and models) that simultaneously meet social needs (more effectively than alternatives) and 
create new social relationships or collaborations. In other words they are innovations that are not only good for society 
but also enhance society’s capacity to act”. As we will see, this consideration poses the issue of scaling up Social 
Innovations from the micro experience to the macro level, transforming a local solution in an innovative policy or 
institution30. 
 
Thus, as the concept of Social Innovation has (re)gained popularity, its meaning has broadened to wider fields and 
levels of application29,30, 28. While it was formerly related mainly to local level systems, or relegated to the action of the so 
called  “third sector”, its new relationships with invention, organisational innovation and social change have considerably 
enlarged the concept in terms of size (e.g. Local Exchange Systems vs global Fair-Trade value chains), actors (from 
traditional charity organisations to social businesses) and scope (transformative of the organisation,  or of society with a 
more participatory governance system). 
 
Hence, against this background, rather than giving a precise definition, the EC’s  characterisation of SI’s wide range of 
applications has resulted in a rather elastic view of the concept. Such a view was mainly elaborated by the author (see 
below) as part of the EC team in charge for the production of the EC Report; a view that was, both  before and after, the 
final delivery of the report, presented in many institutional settings, such as the OECD Working Group on SI31.  
 
 
3. The Front-stage of SI in the EC: an Opportunity to Face a Crisis through 
the Refinement of a Consolidated Strategy 
 
3.1. A brief history of the emergence of the concept of SI and the SI report at the 
Commission: connecting the context, the official documents and the policy 
statements 
 
If one was supposed to write the official story of how SI came to the forefront in the EU policy making, an official story 
can be easily drawn by the executive summary of the EC Social Innovation Report, provided some integrations with 
some past official and public events, documents or statements. This is what we intend to do in this section, also because 
we wish that the reader will be in the condition to re-read this section again, but under a different light, after the reading 
of the “back-stage” perspective.  
 
The start of the “social” and “innovation” match  
 
The story starts by reaffirming that the EU was, since the start of the Lisbon strategy4 and its mid-term review5, actively 
engaged in a new growth strategy for a smart, sustainable and inclusive Europe by 2020. On the other hand:  
 
“The lessons learned from both the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs and the financial crisis have revealed structural 
weaknesses and presented the social dimension of Europe in a new light: the well-held belief that economic growth 
creates employment and wealth to alleviate poverty has been disproved by recent events, and the time has now come to 
try new ways of bringing people out of poverty and promoting growth and well-being not only for, but also with, citizens”8. 
 
Such a statement does not stem out of the blue, since it rises from a story of reflections and official recommendations 
that have been evolving from 2005, starting with the famous Aho Report32 and the Renewed Social Agenda3, passing 
through the Europe’s Social Reality Report2. Other important voices such that of Wim Kok had already in 2004 
questioned the Lisbon Strategy33 as well as the Commission itself34. Although these points of passage were presented 
as somehow planned and reflecting a consistent process of policy awareness and making, they, as we will see in the 
following sections, can also be read as the result of a “garbage can model” where decision makers, opportunities and 
solutions had the chance to meet6. 
 
However, since the 2006 Aho report, the term “socio-economic challenges” was introduced in the EC policy jargon and 
actions though, at the time, the “social” was intended more as broadening the goals of a growth strategy based on 
knowledge. The clear emergence of globalization, the new competing developing countries and the still powerful U.S. 
growth engine required Europe to bet on goals that were less narrow but that were embracing the efforts of the 
European society at large to face the global competition. Among these, as an example, climate change was seen and 
presented as an opportunity to increase wealth and competitiveness. The “social” referred more to the fact that all EU 
stake-holders were called in this endeavor rather than solving social demands. The assumption was still that knowledge 
was the core asset, but that it should have been oriented towards broader challenges. The brand of the voice who stated 
this vision, a former Finnish Prime Minister, made this report a corner stone in making socio-economic an EU term and, 
moreover, an attractor in shaping EU efforts (not by chance, all the following initiatives, such as the European Institute of 
Technology or the 7th Framework Programme for Research made clear references to these as their main aim). In a 
nutshell, the issue was to bet more and on a wider playing field. 
 The Social Reality check 
While the EC was following this direction, an EU social Reality Report promoted by the same EC was on its way in 2007. 
Again, besides the plan, this stemmed from a mixture of some facts that can be easily spotted without an ethnography: i) 
the composition of the advisers of the President was not necessarily of the same political orientation (a bibliographic 
analysis of its composition at that time would show profiles that were not in the same conservative line of the President); 
ii) the EU always wanted to stress its care for the social dimension especially due to cohesion issues stemming from the 
enlargement process, and; iii) the signals that a crisis was “out there”. To be more precise, it was clear to some that, 
besides a specific crisis, a too often hidden social reality made of inequality, poverty, eldercare, early stage school drop-
off35 and other important social issues was characterizing the EU landscape although it wanted to present itself as the 
“place” where competitiveness and solidarity could coexist. However conservative, the EU was the fatherland of the 
welfare state.  
Such a report, as it is usual practice in the EC, originated with a Communication from the Commission to the EU 
Parliament and the Council. And at the time the report was delivered (2007), the crisis started to take shape and an 
increasing number of voices were asking what the Commission planned to do to face such a troubling situation situation. 
In this context, The Renewed Social Agenda, adopted by the EC in 2008, tried to sketch the lines of Europe’s response 
to new social realities and challenges that were exacerbated by the global crisis. The Political Guidelines of President 
Barroso, that are clearly stated in the EC SI Report8, made it clear that: 
 there was a need for a new, much stronger focus on the social dimension of Europe. The valuation of the 
Lisbon Strategy underlined that growth and jobs have not succeeded in helping people out of poverty;  
 yet,  stimulating innovation, entrepreneurship and the knowledge-based society were all at the core of the 
Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs;  
 and Social Innovation could offer a way forward in coping with the societal challenges and the crisis that the 
EU is facing.  
 
To make even clearer the positioning of SI, it was unusually stated that “at a time of major budgetary constraints, social 
innovation is an effective way of responding to social challenges, by mobilizing people’s creativity to develop solutions 
and make better use of scarce resources. Social innovation can also promote an innovative and learning society”. Such 
a phrasing was basically delegating to people what states seemed not to be able to afford any longer. As clearly stated 
in the same report: 
 
“Government responses to the crisis have involved major fiscal stimulus packages, but at the same time they are 
confronted with budgetary constraints. Public finances have been severely affected, with average deficits now reaching 7 
% of GDP and debt levels having increased by 15 percentage points in two years. They are particularly attentive to 
social budgets which, in the EU, represent 27 % of GDP on average. In this context of limited resources, social 
innovation offers a way forward by providing new solutions to pressing social demands while making better use of 
available resources. These growing social needs, together with budgetary constraints, call for innovative public service 
models.” 
 
The narrative, which was based on a well-known and still used (not just in the EU – see Obama’s fund for Social 
Innovation Fund)  policy idea to transform a threat into an opportunity, continued stating that many of these 
developments can — and should — be viewed as also offering economic and social opportunities. The author himself 
wrote with papers based on the mythology of growth such as those offered by climate change36.  
The drawbacks or the missing promises of material growth were not questioned at all besides the few voices that put 
under discussion whether growth was still to be considered as our final aim37,38,39.  
The meeting of President Barroso and the formal endorsement of SI by the EC 
In this context, the Bureau of European Policy Advisers (BEPA) organized on 19th and 20th January 2009 a two day 
workshop with around 40 European stakeholders (representatives of the Economic and Social committee, social 
partners, the social platform), experts and social innovators as well as a few representatives of Commission Services 
The objective was to debate how Europe supports and integrates social innovation in its policies, in the wake of its 
renewed social agenda. Commissioners Špidla and Hübner participated in the seminar as well as the vice-president of 
the EIB (European Investment Bank) and President Barroso who, during the last part of the meeting, had an exchange 
with the participants and drew some conclusions. It is to be noted that already during the workshop, some amongst the 
invited representatives from the SI world expressed some of those concerns and risks that will be further explored in this 
paper. Among these are the unclear relationship between Social Innovation with public policies or that Social Innovation 
must be used to strengthen (not to replace) the European social model giving up the role of the welfare state.  
In his conclusions, the President publicly highlighted the crucial role of SI in sustaining the renewed social agenda so as 
to empower citizens to cope with the rapid pace of economic and social changes. He underlined that it is a very timely 
policy instrument that responds to the crisis and the high levels of unemployment which are forecasted. Thus, an EU 
initiative in this field was needed to make an improved use of existing policies and funding instruments to create the 
conditions in which SI becomes an asset for the European Economic Recovery Programme. President Barroso 
concluded that he would engage all the relevant Commission services in contributing with suggestions. BEPA was asked 
to draw up a report on SI where suggestions received from the workshop participants and Commission services would 
be analyzed. Participants were asked by the President to further contribute by sending written contributions. So far, the 
majority of participants have sent further comments and suggestions.  For a more detailed reading, see the Annex to SI 
Report. Here we just underline, as it will be useful for the back-stage analysis, that the workshop was chaired by a 
person that was very near both to the President and to an expert who, few months later, would have delivered a report 
on SI commissioned by BEPA to feed the EC report. 
 
In this context, the EC moved along two lines. The first one was to show that, however called, SI has been sustained 
and supported by the EU, as it has been prolific in the development of programmes (such as Equal, and the European 
Social Fund) and policies empowering actors to address social needs. In this sense the BEPA set up an Inter-Service 
groupa  involving the main EC Directorates (from health to employment, from development to education and research, 
from enterprise to regional cohesion) to produce a stock taking of what, under different names, has been done by the EC 
in this domain. The aim was to show that the EC, even before the formal rising of SI, took many actions in this direction 
well before the crisis even if labeled under different names. Here we anticipate that this required a very difficult internal 
exercise of pulling together what has been done in the social or the innovation domain, and of differentiating among 
those actions what could have been properly referred to as a SI and what was not, as every EC Directorate produced an 
amazing number of actions carried under the label of either innovation or social. This exercise was made even harder by 
a lack of consensus on what SI referred to, which was in a sense an expected outcome of the Report. Thus many times 
members of the group found themselves in the circular situation of labeling something that was not defined while having 
at the same time the goal to define it.  
The second line was to commission to an external organization and expert for the delivery of a SI report making stock of 
the various definitions that were available, to provide a working definition, to collect what was done in the EU in the field 
of SI, which were the main obstacles, and provide policy recommendations. Unfortunately these two processes went on 
in parallel, so that the EC group could not at least rely on the definition provided by the external experts. On the base of 
these two inputs, BEPA elaborated its report that has been published in a first version in July 2010 (followed by an 
updated version in 2011) and represents one, if not the main artifact, that constitutes the base of this analysis. 
3.2. Issues Related to the Outcome View: a Multi-level Approach 
While the EC report embraced this means/ends and multilevel view of SI, a question mark remained still open on what 
should be intended by social outcome, that is, what does it improving human well-being mean given the variety and 
broadness of  the various approaches and definitions39?  The issue at the time was to put some boundary to what this 
‘social’ output refers. The perceived risk was, provided this variety,   generating such a  confusion and ambiguity that all 
that had and was being done in the social realm, within or outside the EC,  could have been included and thus labelled 
as SI. Hence, in order to avoid the provision of a wide, but presumably meaningless, single definition of SI, the decision 
has been to acknowledge the existence of different views, reaching, as we will see, this multi-level (Front-stage) or 
“elastic” (Back-stage) view of the “social output”: elastic or multilevel, because instead of giving one definition, it tried to 
provide different ones within a framework able to contain those different views while differentiating them and at the same 
time offer a sound relationship between these different perspectives. Moreover, besides providing a wide overview of 
experiences and suggested policy actions, it led to some considerations about some risks that the concept could bring 
into the social policy debate, although avoiding to make this connection explicit and critical as indeed we propose in this 
paper. These three views are briefly presented below, as they will serve the purpose of the following “back-stage” 
analysis. 
 
3.2.1. The Social Demand Perspective: Approach 1 (or the “Ghetto” 
view) 
According to the EC Report, a narrow interpretation of ‘social outcome’ views the social dimension as something 
complementary if not separated from the economic or the business dimension. We refer to this as the “ghetto” view, 
since what is social is treated as something separated from what is to be considered as economic and is  thus targeted 
and “confined” to specific actors (such as social enterprises) with specific instruments and policies. ‘Social’ would refer to 
the needs of those groups, communities or segments of society which are more vulnerable and less able to be involved 
in or benefit from the value generated by the market economy. The main rationale behind the need to pursue SI is that 
the effects of the financial and economic crisis on the social sphere are more than ever uncertain and dramatic. At one 
level, these SI programs can accelerate long-delayed changes; at another, they can prevent psychological pathologies 
(such as those stemming from unemployment) arising from these unprecedented uncertainties. It is therefore necessary 
to bring a change that will protect those who are most vulnerable to the crisis, prevent discrimination and increase the 
capacity of all to find a new place in this changing world. The main focus would then be on issues such as the integration 
of disadvantaged groups (including unemployed youth, migrants, etc.), new ways of providing unmet social, health and 
educational services, care of children and the elderly or urban regeneration. Both the EC report and the Study by the 
Young Foundation present many cases of this type. 
 
3.2.2. The Societal Challenges Perspective: Approach 2 (the “reforming” view) 
A broader view, anticipated by the previously mentioned Aho Report, suggests that in a sustainable development 
perspective, the creation of well-being can be pursued achieving Grand Challenges, which are at the same time social 
and economic (indeed, they entered the EC vocabulary inspiring many EC policies and instruments, such as the 
European Institute of Innovation and Technology). The boundary between the social and the economic domains blurs, 
and the ‘social’ becomes an opportunity, rather than a constraint, to generate value. In other words, instead of 
complementing economic innovation with a social dimension, this policy “philosophy” aims at ‘reforming’ the very 
meaning of what is economic and what is social, whereby these two domains tend to collapse. Climate change is a 
paradigmatic example; it is both an economic and social challenge, and it involves all of us, from the wealthier to the 
poorest40,41,42. Another is Rifkin’s  so called “Third Industrial Revolution”36. Here, innovation is seen as a process that 
should tackle long term ‘societal challenges’ through new forms of relationships between social actors8. From this 
perspective, all the main challenges currently faced by the EC are both economic and social in nature. Taking for 
example the Cohesion Policy, R&D excellence and regional innovation, they are seen as complementary policies with a 
common objective to maximise the development of a knowledge-based economic potential43 throughout the European 
Union. In this context, both gender mainstreaming and issues related to disadvantaged groups such as young and 
elderly people, disabled people, ethnic minorities and migrants should not be regarded as purely ‘social’ issues, but as 
an integral part of a broader view of what we shall refer to as economic development44. Equally, major and chronic 
diseases— responsible for 86 % of deaths in the EU — and rising levels of overweight and obesity are linked by 
common risk factors produced by food quality, lifestyles and physical inactivity. They can be reduced, and thereby 
deliver significant economic outcomes by bringing down health costs. A similar argument is that innovation in the social 
sector generates productivity and economic value for the whole society.  
3.2.3. The Systemic Change Perspective: Approach 3 (the “empowering” view) 
A third view focuses more on the ultimate objective of SI: a sustainable systemic change to be reached through a 
process of organisational development and changes in relationships between institutions and stakeholders. The 
empowering/learning/network process dimension is central and the outcomes are improvements in the way people live 
and work. In a sense, the outcome of SI is reshaping society itself, or, said differently, the process dimension becomes 
also the main outcome. Here the social dimension of innovation relates to changes in fundamental attitudes and values, 
strategies and policies, organisational structures and processes, delivery systems and services, methods and ways of 
working, responsibilities and tasks of institutions and linkages between them and different types of actors. It refers to a 
process that incrementally changes human attitudes and behaviours, and the related responsibilities of — and 
relationships between — organisations and target groups. As stated in the report: “The dialectic relationship between SI 
and an innovative society takes its place here since an innovative society offers the conditions for social innovations to 
emerge and in return SI reconfigures the common culture, structures and relationships to suggest different approaches 
and the choice of new priorities which reinforce the innovative society”. 
In terms of concrete policy-making, this view suggests that institutions should encourage the involvement of a wide 
range of stakeholders and target groups in the definition and implementation of policies. For example, a vast array of 
innovative Commission-led policymaking processes go in this direction, from the Open Method of Coordination in the 
creation of platforms, social experimentation and service delivery mechanisms, to participative processes such as the 
inclusion of gender bodies, disability organisations and other NGOs in monitoring committees (e.g. the ESF and the 
ERDF EU Funds). In this context, the issues addressed range from the organisation of work to lifelong learning and 
vocational training, and from alternative forms of care, in particular childcare, to the management of change and 
institutional capacity building. 
 
3.2.4. A Working Front- Stage Definition 
It is now clear that according to the EC, as SI emerged as a new concept, it could not be encapsulated within a tight 
definition with strictly designated actors, objectives and means. It also became clear that SI is part of a broader 
movement that risks using SI as a “container” concept in which everything bearing the word “social” can fit. Here we will 
summarize the official definitions of the EC as regards SI and its positioning in the EU policy landscape.  
 
“Assuming that the process dimension is a sine qua non requirement in defining a Social Innovation as such, those 
social outcomes can be seen according to three different approaches (the outcome dimension): 
 
1. The narrow approach: Social demands that are traditionally not addressed by the market or existing institutions and 
are directed towards vulnerable groups in society. Approach 1 
 
2. The Societal Challenges approach: Societal challenges in which the boundary between ‘social’ and ‘economic’ blurs, 
and which are directed towards society as a whole. Approach 2 
 
3. The systemic change approach: the process of reforming society in the direction of a more participative arena where 
empowerment and learning are sources and outcomes of well-being. Approach 3 
 
As it has been proposed, these approaches are proposed as not mutually exclusive, but rather as interdependent parts 
of a common framework: the first approach is the foundation for the second which creates the conditions for the third — 
an innovation that addresses a social demand (e.g. care of the elderly) contributes to addressing a societal challenge 
(e.g. ageing society) and, through its process dimension (e.g. the active engagement of the elderly), it contributes to 
reshaping the society in the direction of participation and empowerment.  
 
In the next section we will leave the front stage and explore the story from the backstage. 
4. Going to the Backstage: the Manufacturing of a Social Innovation Policy 
at the EC (Approach 4) 
 
4.1. Methodology: a full ethnographic immersion with a partially covert strategy  
 
The study was conducted during 7 years of the author’s full participant observation in the European Commission. 
Standard ethnographic methodologies of participant observation were applied45,46,47,48. In particular, he was engaged in a 
full participant observation similar to Van Maanen’s48 seminal observations on the making of a policeman (though he did 
not reach the point to become a policeman himself), or the masterpiece of Julian Orr49. 
 
Indeed, here a strong caveat needs to be made which qualifies and differentiates the methodology from a participant 
observation. The author falls undoubtedly in the realm of a full participant observer, but, as a clear differentiating aspect, 
such an observation was not part of his tasks while, on the other hand, he was completely part of the group observed. In 
this sense, he literarily followed and brought to its full consequences Van Maanen’s suggestion who states that: 
 
"When used as a method, ethnography typically refers to fieldwork 
(alternatively, participant-observation) conducted by a single investigator who 
'lives with and lives like' those who are studied, usually for a year or more." 
(Van Maanen, 1996). 
 
 
In particular, the author was detached to the EC as policy officer in a Directorate Générale (2005-2007), and as a 
member of BEPA (2007-2011). In both experiences, he was able to observe the highest level of decision making in the 
EU institutions and, during his work, he had to interrupt his research work although his research competence and 
background were amongst the main reasons for his recruitment. Indeed, his knowledge as a researcher in organization 
studies was needed to work on specific policy projects (being, amongst the last ones, SI) though he was neither 
requested nor expected to conduct an ethnographic participant observation. Nonetheless, he had the opportunity to 
make clear, in many situations, his interest in observing the many EC phenomena in which he was engaged. This EC 
assignment was thus related to a research competence; although it was not formally envisioned or expected, the 
observations he conducted that were, obviously, embedded in the very nature of his role. Moreover, for the wide range 
of issues and domains he was involved in, he did not join the Commission with a predefined research goal or strategy 
but on the other hand, being a researcher, he had general hypotheses on the making of decisions and, in particular, of 
policies that he wished to inquire about and test. The author engaged in the field work had the goal, once his experience 
was completed, to portray the social views and practices he observed50, including the current one related to the SI, but 
also on other issues such as the making of EU organizations (Forthcoming). In a nutshell, the field work could be 
described as a strict and even extended application of Van Maanen’s views , but without the need of engaging in a 
complete covert strategy (as those researching within criminal groups51). We would call this method as full immersion 
with a partially covert strategy (in the sense that the goal of observing was not stated either as the primary one, or as 
part of his job duties, though this intent was disclosed with peers and high ranking officials). 
 
This approach follows the direction of the seminal work of Pierre Bourdieu52,53 or Edward J. Nell54 when describing 
fieldwork in sociology. 
Such an intensively immersive experience allowed him to rely on a wide range of well-defined, though un-planned 
methods such as informal interviews, direct observation, participation in the life of the group, collective discussions, 
analyses of personal or confidential documents produced within the group, self-analysis, results from activities 
undertaken off or online, and life-histories and mythologies. Thanks to the extended and in-depth  exposure, the 
researcher has been able to obtain more detailed and accurate information about the individuals, community, and/or 
population under study and his “embedding in it”. Such a strong point of observation and interaction over an extended 
period of time allowed the researcher to discover discrepancies between what participants say or publicly disclaim — 
and often believe — should happen (the formal system – or, as we call it here, the front-stage) and what actually does 
happen (what is here referred to as the back-stage); moreover, as he was both involved in front-stage (e.g. presenting 
the report or other similar official activities) and back-stage situations (e.g. internal discussions or documents revisions), 
he could observe the relationships and interactions between these two levels which are, in the specific case of policy 
making, rather distant due to obvious needs to manage issues related to diplomacy, consensus and political negotiation. 
 The fieldwork involved collecting data in the forms of briefings, emails, conversations, meetings, notes, working 
practices, symbols. It also included, as noted by many ethnographers55, observations of rituals of passage from one 
stage to another along the path that leads from a legitimate peripheral participation to centrality56,  forms of celebrating 
decision, roles, and identities, distributing glories and blame or rationalizing actions as planned and wanted although 
they were indeed the result of casual situations, temporal orders or even unwanted behaviours that proved to be, ex-
post, more or less successful57. For reasons of confidentiality and also for the EC practice to never share “sensitive” 
information in a written form but rather through oral conversations, the bulk of the author’s information was based on the 
very nature of the policy work itself, based on few traceable written notes and documents, and many conversations 
which were spoken through a typical EC policy jargon. For these reasons, sensitive information will not be disclosed 
and, for the purpose of this paper, these rituals, celebrations and gorgons will not be explored further as they would 
deserve a work on its own. 
 
5. The Backstage of SI in the EC: Making Sense of a Mismatch between a 
Strategy and its Expected Outcomes 
 
5.1. The Back-stage Process between 2005 and 2008 
 
Since 2005, it was clear to all “in the house” that the Lisbon Agenda was not delivering as expected. At that time, 
concerns were almost exclusively about stagnating growth and increasing unemployment. The President wanted to 
differentiate himself from his predecessor who launched the strategy, but wanted to give a signal of continuity. Yet a 
“black” crisis was not at the horizon, but an increasing number of policy documents and reports, first and foremost the 
“Aho Report”31, followed by many others5,32, started to mention the need to orient EU efforts towards Grand Challenges 
that, shortly, became “Societal Challenges”. Among these, Climate Change or Ageing were mentioned, but not 
positioned in the dramatic context of an unprecedented crisis. The framework was still based on the assumption of a 
possible and endless knowledge driven material growth and employment, which was underpinned by deeper 
assumptions on the need to increase the openness of markets, foster individual initiative and an unassailable faith in 
technological progress. In this line, the mid-term review of the Lisbon Strategy5 stated that the strategy itself was right, 
but the weakness of results was a matter of poor implementation, in particular as regards the Member States. Definitely, 
a Societal Challenge was seen as a broader vision to gather, orient and foster the fragmented EU efforts to increase 
global competitiveness through an increased investment in knowledge, its free circulation (the so called 5th freedom), 
Research and Technological Development (RTD) and the social entrepreneur or the societal enterprise or institution 
(such as the EIT, the JTIs or the ERC) as protagonists.58 
 
It would be an euphemism to state that the 2008 crisis, for its unpredictability (yet, some did anticipate it such as 
Taleb’s seminal work in 200759) and magnitude, put the entire Lisbon set-up under discussion. The question in the 
Commission entourage, inside and outside, was rather clear: in order to get out of the tunnel, is it only about pushing 
more for market/competitiveness and technology driven innovation policy?  The larger question was: is there a need for 
an explicit social policy governed at the state or even at the supranational level - which is, indeed, what is currently 
under discussion in Europe? Yet it is important to note that, even before 2008, none of the EU countries respected, with 
a  few minor exceptions, the Maastricht parameters as well as the mandates of the Lisbon Agenda. States’ interventions 
going beyond the boundaries of a pure market driven approach were still a normal practice, however blamed and 
criticized. After 2008, with the EU still unable to understand where the crisis was leading, the Commission had to 
recognize a certain level of elasticity in applying the strict rules of a zero deficit policy. On the other hand, such a 
concession was avulsed as it was difficult to be framed within the conservative nature of the European Commission, the 
strong role played by Germany on zero deficit policies, and UK’s policies on innovation and market liberalization. Beyond 
that, the recognition of the need for a Direct Social Policy would have been politically hampering  Barroso’s Commission 
at its roots, that were basically based on the Lisbon Strategy. Against this background, and pushed by an emerging 
lobby of conservative-liberal thinkers, hereby referred to as the -SI policy lobbyb -, connected to EU institutions through 
strong political ties, the President of the EC set up in 2007 a workshop on SI chaired by him personally. As mentioned 
before, BEPA was in charge for the organization of the workshop. 
 
 
5.2. Why Social Innovation and not a Social Policy? The Hope that a New Policy 
Fashion will Drive Stakeholders’ Energies in Sorting out a Solution 
 
 
The reason for the choice to go for SI is intuitive but also more interesting when studying policy making by observing 
the process from the inside. At that time, the SI policy lobby pushed the President, through an intermediate high level 
contact, to organize the above mentioned workshop on SI that he attended personally. This lobby was composed by 
those whom we refer to here as “policy-entangled-entrepreneurs”, who had political connections within the EC and 
interests in pushing new concepts in the Commission’s agenda. Once these concepts would have been in, they would 
have been first-comers in exploiting the economic and political value that would stem from the transformation of the 
policy agenda into funding programmes, advisory groups and major events.  This approach in lobbying, that it is not at all 
illegal, was not new at the author’s eyes, and was often taking the form of daily courtesy visits at the 11th (where BEPA 
was) and 13th floor of the Berlaymont (where the President was). Similar lobbies were composed by Universities and 
were concerned with EC manoeuvres in the area of higher education, notably, the EIT, others by inspirational leaders 
and backing enterprises aiming at influencing and orienting the EC energy agendac.  
 
As said, after the workshop, the President gave a mandate to BEPA to deliver a report on SI and set up-an inter-
service groupd to support its production. The author was one of those in charge of both the report and the group (and co-
responsible for asserting what has been reported in this article as the Front-Stage beliefs of the EC in SI). The report 
would have been based on the results of a mix between the EC internal experiences , the results of the external study 
commissioned to one of the members of the “SI policy lobby” and their use and synthesis operated by BEPA who would 
have generated the “European Commission Report Social Innovation Report”. The need to use BEPA as the final 
producer was clearly because, whatever the study, the Commission always underlines its independence, thus wants to 
disclaim that the results of the many external studies are not binding in any sense the EC policy action. 
 
What stems from briefings, formal and informal speeches, email exchanges but also implicit taken for granted, was 
that the concept of SI was combining the policy mainstream of Lisbon based on entrepreneurial, market based, bottom-
up, liberal, technology and innovation driven growth (and the implicit role of the private actor in supplying what the state 
should not and could no longer do) with the growing demands for doing something about the dramatic situation of the 
social European landscape. The EU was suffering continuous bailouts, increasing unemployment, deficits out of control 
and a decrease in social expenditure: the very notion of the welfare state as we used to know it since the 19th century60 
was at stake19,20,21 and such a belief is well stated in the Report’s sentences that we quoted above. SI seemed to 
combine these two apparently diverging demands in a harmonious synthesis: innovation could safeguard the 
conservative/liberal DNA of the Commission while its focus on the “Social outcome” could avoid the criticism that the EC 
was insensitive to, and unable to give responses to pressing social demands. From this perspective, SI appears more as 
a policy compromise than a novel policy stream. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This compromise was only possible due to the cul de sac in which the Commission was, and still is operating, as 
clearly reflected in the milieux of stakeholders’ and Member States’ interests at that time, which is not so dissimilar from 
the geopolitics of today’s debates. In short, a leading club composed by Germany, UK and the Nordic countries, that  
were led by conservative liberal governments, did not want to rely on any state intervention and a deficit spending policy. 
As the same line is still and perhaps even more strongly debated in the year in which this article is written (2012), that 
would have hampered the making of the single market after painful reforms that have been carried by some of those in 
that direction, bearing high political costs, (just considering Mrs. Thatcher’s period or Angela Merkel’s reforms in the 
labour market and pensions). Also those more in trouble, like Spain, Italy, Portugal and Ireland, were led by conservative 
albeit not concretely liberal governments. And although the second group would have been more willing to support some 
kind of Social Policy that would have implied a clear “green light” for deficit spending, their weak position in terms of 
Social 
(EU Context) 
Social Innovation 
Innovation 
(Lisbon) 
public debt and EU credibility somehow forced them to “follow” the mainstream thinking that the old welfare state had to 
be revised, if not buried, as part of history. Still, this contradiction is at the very core of the EU impasse of the Euro zone. 
Allowing for  EU deficit spending was seen from the club, in a few words, as legitimizing a heavy slow down in structural 
reforms aimed at building the single market, reforms that had to be carried firstly by the followers. In this context, the 
space for a self standing Social Policy was, as it seems to be still now, almost impossible, since it would have required 
some degree of “sovereign control” by virtuous Member States or the EC on the treasury, social expenditure and reforms 
of the followers. In this sort of trade-off between the need to act, and a political orientation contrary to any sort of public 
direct intervention, the author had the mandate, as a counter-balance, to put the word “social” here and there in 
briefings, speeches and inter-service consultations (from which EC Communications would have stemmed) to show that 
the EC was aware and taking action on the social sphere.  
The table below shows the occurrence of some key terms in the Commission Communications to the Parliament and 
the Council between 2005 (year of the mid-term review) and the end of 2011. 
 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Innovation 313 421 440 428 402 442 370 
social  622 781 796 815 837 885 681 
social innovation 0 0 6 4 10 20 20 
social innovations 1 1 6 4 3 6 7 
Sum of soc. inn. 1 1 12 8 13 26 27 
societal challenge 0 0 0 2 2 2 9 
societal 
challenges 10 17 23 46 28 39 37 
Sum of soc. chal. 10 17 23 48 30 41 46 
 
Source: Euro-lex (www.euro-lex.eu) 
 
It is to be noted that Social Innovation had a marked increase since 2007 in one of the most official documents of the 
EC (Communications are the basic document and act through which the Commission makes proposals or anticipates 
them to the EU Council and Parliament). Less marked, but noticeable, is the trend of the societal challenges. These 
ones, which were less concerned with the weakest segments of society but more on competitiveness through global 
challenges, were chosen as a focus in 2008. If we consider that a Commission Communication takes almost one year to 
be developed, it seems that this choice occurred prior to the 2008 crisis (thus showing up clearly in 2009). 
 
Such a situation provides a back-stage for re-interpreting the above three approaches to SI proposed by the EC. 
Accordingly, these will be phrased differently: 
 
1. The narrow approach: Social demands that are traditionally not addressed by the market or existing 
institutions and are directed towards vulnerable groups in society. Approach 1 
 
A back stage reading:  as public resources are going to be over soon, and cuts in social expenditure are unavoidable 
not to betray the faith in an unreachable control over public deficits, the weakest segments of society should start to 
equip themselves to find new solutions to their demands, with the charitable help of social entrepreneurs. What the 
public sector can do is to remove as much as possible barriers to innovation pursuing, as done before, a knowledge 
market more sensitive to social demands. Indeed, this was one of the main conclusions of the President’s Workshop, the 
EC report, and the external experts’ report. 
 
2. The Societal Challenges approach: societal challenges in which the boundary between ‘social’ and 
‘economic’ blurs, and which are directed towards society as a whole. Approach 2 
 
A back stage reading: as we cannot disperse the few resources available and Europe needs to lead the global 
challenge in some domain, it is required to concentrate EU efforts and institutions towards few priority goals, provided 
that growth will come only through an increased privatization of these efforts, a public actor playing the role of mediator 
in setting the ground for industrial “collusions” to standardize major technological developments, and technology pushing 
as the main driver to scale up in the global rankings. In this direction, the so called Public Private Partnerships were 
increasingly supported, concentrating research and development funds in the hands of groups of leading academic and 
industrial partnerships with the wish that, through their agreement, new EU technological standards, as it was the case 
with the GSM, could find their place in the global competition. For reference, see the JTIs, the ETPs and the forthcoming 
flagships. 
 
3. The systemic change approach: The need to reform society in the direction of a more participative arena 
where empowerment and learning are sources and outcomes of well-being. Approach 3 
 
A back stage reading:  while it is indeed a repetition of the process dimension when set also as a goal (societal 
change to change society), it politically advises people and institutions that they will be increasingly delegated 
responsibility for their destiny (the so called “empowerment”); namely citizens are called to find innovative ways to sort it 
out themselves through novel types of alliances that will not rely for long on public assistance. In a sense, the 
demonstrated incapacity to set up effective global governance mechanisms to tackle fundamental challenges such as 
climate change, induces a perspective of governance as something that should be increasingly delegated to citizens 
giving them the tools to feed, bottom-up, the policy making impasse. 
 
4. An undeclared perspective on Social Innovation: to acknowledge the impossibility to think about a new 
welfare or a full-fledged EU Social Policy 
 
In the context of this painful acknowledgement that the state will not be able to do what it did until now in ensuring   
proper levels of welfare nor will the EU set up a full-fledged Social Policy, it is more digestible if it is put in the terms of a 
challenge rather than a paralyzed policy-making process which is now struggling to find new ways to act in a context of 
dramatically decreasing resources and increasing social problems. For obvious confidentiality reasons, and strongly 
believing that politics cannot be dealt according to a wiki-leaks approach, we will not disclose who and where these 
considerations came from. On the other hand, we would find this exercise as fruitless. We honestly believe that it is 
enough to open a newspaper to grasp that politics is facing un unprecedented cul de sac and that, to hold society 
together, however debatable, it is better to sell a dream hoping that a sound answer will come. In this sense the authors 
do not express any opinion about any kind of political cynicism or any other sort of unfair policy behaviour. We simply 
observe that here is where we stand.  
 
 6. Risks Associated with Social Innovation 
 
Like every new attractive concept, Social Innovation holds some risks. We examine some of them below, underlining 
that some of them stemmed from the workshop conclusion itself (the reader could easily spot them out with a bit of 
attention to what was reported or, as it would have been preferable, remain unreported), others from internal and 
external discussion, some from the author himself (either by adding new risks or trying to make others more explicit ). 
 
The first risk is the fourth approach proposed above, namely to provide EU citizens and social actors with an 
unknown, unproven and ill defined mechanism to think that something new could take society out of the tunnel. Indeed, 
as empirically proven by Kahneman and Tversky61, people show a risk-averse behaviour in gains involving moderate 
probabilities and small probability losses; risk-seeking behaviour in losses involving moderate probabilities and small 
probability gains. In this sense, the wider public prefers a risk with a small chance of a gain rather than the certainty of a 
loss. SI could be seen as a possible loss, but with a minimal gain. In the same spirit, SI could be easily seen as a good 
way to keep people busy in embracing and filling the meaning of this new policy, while taking time to spot how to sort out 
the situation. 
 
The second risk is to view SI as renaming or relabeling all those initiatives and practices that carry some social 
dimension. Such a risk was echoed during the BEPA workshop where it has been underlined by social players that SI 
cannot be seen simply as a rebranding of current programmes. As Social Innovation has been defined here, the social 
outcome is a necessary, but not sufficient, component. However, the process that leads to the outcome should also 
carry elements of novelty in reshaping social interactions. In this sense, helping children to succeed at school is not a 
Social Innovation if this achievement, however important, is not obtained through, for example, a new way of involving 
parents, teachers and other stakeholders. Furthermore, such an extension became valid for the term “innovation”. When 
looking and current documents or FP7 work programs, many ICT or RTD calls for proposals try to fall into the basket of 
Social Innovation. 
 
The third concern, which was also raised during the SI workshop, is about the respective roles of the private, public 
and third sectors. Of course, the private sector has an important role to play providing additional resources in a time of 
limited public budgets, but also for injecting the creativity, flexibility and innovativeness that characterise the 
business/entrepreneurial world. However, such an involvement also raises issues of ethics, responsibility, quality of 
services, and access. Indeed SI should not be interpreted as the public sector giving up its social responsibility; the 
public sector must continue to play a pivotal role62.  
 
The fourth concern is that the involvement of the private sector in the provision of social services should not be 
pursued to the detriment of some of the fundamental values underpinning the European Social Model. None of these 
values should be excluded. However, some studies have shown situations of abuse or, more simply, of reduced access 
of the weakest groups as a consequence of a market logic. Indeed, SI requires an increased capacity for the public to 
assess and monitor that appropriate quality and access is ensured, whoever the actor that delivers them. In this sense, 
such an involvement should go hand in hand with an increased effort from the public sector in setting the rules of the 
game and ensure they are respected. Such an effort could take various forms ranging from regulation to certification, 
from monitoring to evaluation. As underlined during the BEPA workshop, SI must be used to strengthen, not replace, the 
European Social Model.  
 
The fifth risk is to confine SI to bottom-up or grassroots initiatives. Often, Social Innovations emerge at the local level 
from sharing and networking between a wide range of actors; it can also be generated by market initiatives with a social 
concern. However, as the European experience has shown over centuries of experimentation, SI can also stem from the 
macro/policy level, when policy-makers, public administrators, business and opinion leaders or academics reflect, 
propose and implement new ways to address social issues. Hence, innovative pension schemes or unemployment 
policies might be rightly conceived in terms of SI provided that they are able to deliver more in the context of the 
constraints and challenges ahead. Indeed, SI places an increased role on the involvement of citizens in the design and 
implementation of solutions to social needs.. But vis-à-vis policy-makers, such a role shall not be seen as a substitution, 
but rather as a means to support policy-making bodies in being more effective. In this sense, as was underlined in the 
BEPA workshop, SI should be mainstreamed in all societal areas and be seen as a contribution to the EU’s social 
objectives and not as a substitute to current public social policies.  
 The last risk, as for any new concept, is that one should avoid seeing SI as a panacea for solving all problems. 
Furthermore, each innovation has to be examined on the base of the evidence of its impact and its limitations. Too often, 
the benefits of SI as adduced by its enthusiasts were based upon anecdotal evidence rather than on scientifically proven 
facts. In addition, the potential costs are often minimised or ignored altogether. For this reason, a particular attention 
should be devoted to issues related to evaluation, impact assessment and measurement. Moreover, whatever the policy, 
it seems that the moment has come to question what are the underlying goals and assumptions as they lead to very 
different results. Taking SI, if this means giving up the role of governments in guiding change, that should be clear as 
well as that governments understood that nothing can be taken any longer for granted, no one can be protected life-long 
and that we must take more responsibility for our destiny as other options have shown that we can try to close our 
accounts with the past, but the past will not necessarily close its accounts with us.  
 
In this sense, if Social Innovation stands for social responsibility, awareness and action at all levels (from the micro to the 
macro level), sustaining the creation of a new social pact where all do their best to make it work, then we express our 
hope that further research and inquiry will be pursued. Indeed, it is rather obvious that our development model and life-
style is no longer sustainable. Besides myopic dreams of the past or even more dangerous wishes for less freedom in 
exchange for promises of wellbeing, if Social Innovation is a way to name the many possible pathways to fundamentally 
rethink our societies in the direction of well being, intergenerational fairness, equality and awareness of our 
environmental and anthropological limits, then this paper hopes to contribute to such an urgently needed debate.   
 
7. Conclusion: Time to Re-label or to Re-think the Social? 
 
It would be redundant to say something about the economic, social and environmental situation in 2012. It is indeed 
disastrous but what is worth considering, as wisely said by Carmen Reinhart, Kenneth Rogoff63, is whether or not we still 
believe that this time will be different. An empirical analysis of centuries of defaults and bailouts is still not convincing 
enough to ask ourselves whether, if we don’t do things differently, this time will be the same or, different in the sense of 
worse.  
 SI on its own, for what we know, cannot be either categorized among the responsible, or as the difference to change the 
current socio-economic trajectory. From the latter perspective, there is no systematic evidence that SI can deliver the 
value it promises or scale to a level where this value makes a substantial difference. Up to now, we still see that this 
concept embodies great uncertainties and even less strategic and tactical oversight and direction.  
There is no systematic evidence that Social Innovations deliver a tangible social value at both the outcome and process 
level. As said by the same EC report, there are plenty of anecdotal stories at the micro-level which suffer method and 
homogeneity in the parameters and data used to evaluate results. This is also due to the lack of a clear definition, as we 
can measure something when this something is somehow defined. To us, a single definition does not exist, nor a range 
of accepted ones. Here we tried to propose a possible set of definitions, but they are still too broad and, moreover, bear 
plenty of risks when applied with a lack of rigorous research. Seemingly, and related to this, there are clear issues about 
the scalability and the possibility to replicate these experiences at a wider and meso/macro level. Indeed, SI experiences 
seem to remain confined in the local context in which they raised, experiencing also great difficulties in growing in size, 
scope and target (EC 2011). But most of all, they have difficulties in growing in their capacity to be generalized. Scaling 
up is not just a matter of doing something small bigger. It is rather about making  experience a model, and a model a 
possible way to shape society. Scalability here is intended as the opportunity to transform a success for few in a policy 
for all, and an anecdotal story in a scientific paper. There is no reason to blame SI for the dramatically decaying of the 
social situation. Yet, it is as well hard to claim that most of the promises made by social innovators and their fans  (EC 
included) have been kept or had a concrete possibility to be kept unless SI is addressed as more than yet another policy 
fashion to keep our minds busy and hopes alive. Indeed, besides or even thanks to SI, a reflection on a wider and direct 
EU Social Policy or a new role of the welfare state cannot be said to be shadowed by the achievements of SI unless, as 
we did when intended SI in the broader sense, this would inspire policy makers, institutions and heads of governments 
to become more socially innovators. 
 
As regards the former perspective, SI can be held responsible, together with many other policy fashions, of being a way 
to distract society from a urgently needed reflection that goes at the roots of how the EU, and the world in general, 
though it could make the machinery work when this is based on assumptions such as endless material growth, debt 
economy, technology as a solution and not, also, as a problem maker, and innovation as a necessity. While writing this 
article, the author received a call for proposals issued by the EC making an  explicit reference to Social Innovation and 
ICT. The risk is that many others, when looking at forthcoming calls for proposals, are doing and will do the same in 
domains like health, agriculture or energy. Again, text analysis might be very helpful. Sincerely, it is not clear to the 
author if all this policy bricolage signals that we embraced a development philosophy that can be compliant with our 
anthropological features and natural rights and duties to build a world in which we can decently live and let live, 
especially for those that are yet to come and have no right to vote. Indeed, SI, as much as many other policy fashions 
that might stem or are in the process to blossom, can play the role of providing new solutions, but also that of keeping 
society bound to assumptions that were not written in Abram’s table. Hopefully for this reason, within the current FP7 call 
for proposals, under the theme social sciences and humanities, there is a specific call for proposals, which is worth 2.5 
million Euros, that should strike our attention. Its title is: “Social innovation: empowering people, driving change?”. The 
author confesses how that question mark, which follows the title of the same EC Report, is surprisingly summarising 
what this paper is about, reinsuring that such a question is seeking for an answer also by the same EC. 
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